A Study
of
the Human Cognitional Structure
According to Bernard J.F. Lonergan:

As a Preliminary Analysis of a Presupposition of
the Contemporary Christological Questions

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INTRODUCTION

What makes contemporary Christologies radically differ from those before the
seventeenth century is the emergence of confusion as to what we mean by 'doing
Christology.' This is not to say that confusion can be observed in the field of
Christology only, but rather that Christology is one of the fields of theology in which
the symptoms of a more general confusion appear in an especially acute way.
It is hardly possible for any theologian to deny that our understanding of the world has been undergoing a fundamental shift in the past three centuries and that the possibility of asking new questions has made it possible for diverse kinds of theology to emerge and for specialization in each kind to advance to such extent never before experienced. These changes in human inquiry in general and theology in particular have brought to light the problems underlying theological inquiries which had long been overlooked or taken for granted, and aroused new concern for the need for reflection on the nature and role of theology from a new perspective.

One of the characteristics that make the theology of Berbard J.F. Lonergan different from theologies done by others is that his theology begins not simply with the object of inquiry but with the interrelation between the object of inquiry and its inquirers themselves from the perspective described above, and that readers of his works are invited to join in his investigation of the problems which arise in terms of the interrelation. Understanding Lonergan's theology, therefore, requires us also to make a dive to the bottom of the problems concerning the interrelationship between the object of theological inquiry and its inquirers. Accordingly, although the particular topic I would like to study is Lonergan's understanding of the doctrine of the hyposstatic union, I had better begin it with examining the problems concerning the meaning of 'doing theology', more specifically, of 'doing Christology'.

The question this paper attempts to answer is twofold: "What do we mean by 'presuppositions' in general?" and "Why and for what do presuppositions function?" In order to answer that, treated will be the nature of human cognitional and volitional activities; their relation to the constitution and development of this world; and the role of belief.

§ 1. The Structure of Human Cognitional Activities; Questions and Knowledge of Facts

Over the centuries and throughout the world there have appeared various, different definitions of theology. No matter how different each of them from others, there is at least one common denominator, an element which must be included in any definition of ‘Theology.’ It is that theology has to do with human understanding. If there is a need of solving the confusion in theology, we had better begin with asking questions concerning the nature of human understanding.
In *Insight*, Lonergan elaborates the nature of human knowing both in terms of its immanent structure and of its relation to the (corresponding) world of the real.

According to Lonergan, human knowing consists of several mutually related conscious operations which are structured according to their relation to the two central operations: asking questions of the whatness of the data and questions of the correctness of the answer to the questions of the whatness. It functions as follows: we become aware of certain data, ask a question seeking the intelligibility of the data, gather images necessary for the happening of direct insight, get direct insights through images, grasp the intelligibility in the data, conceptualize what has been understood through the direct insight as hypotheses, ask reflective questions whether the hypotheses correspond to reality, whether the conditions for the existence of the hypothesised intelligibility are fulfilled, as a matter of fact, by checking with the data, get indirect insights, and judge that the hypotheses are correct, that corresponding reality exists.

What constitute the dynamism of such spontaneous and structured human conscious activities and prompt our consciousness from lower levels to higher ones are the transcendental notions, which are experienced as the unrestricted, detached and disinterested desire to know in the level of sensing, intelligent and rational consciousness. Being propelled by the transcendental notions, the human subject transcends oneself from the sensible level of consciousness to the intelligent one by intending the intelligible, and to the rational consciousness by intending the truth and being, until it knows the entire world of being which is proportionate to the capacity of man's intellect.

Self-transcendence of the subject does not stop with judgment, by which we know the facts. The transcendental notions further promote our conscious intentionality through the realm of knowing facts to the realm of making facts by performing intentional activities which affect the relations between conditions and the conditioned of possible beings towards the actualization of the development of this universe.

§ 2. The Structure of Human Volitional Activities:
Questions, Knowledge of Making Facts and Making Facts

1. Development of the Universe and Human Responsibility

This universe does not consist of statically related aggregates of things. It is
incomplete and dynamically emerging. It grows and develops as it heads towards fully intelligible being by being promoted by the finality, which is the 'upwardly directed dynamism of proportionate being.' All things in this universe are related with one another as a part of recurrent schemes, as conditions for the existence of other things or as the conditioned by the existence of others. Except things which belong to the levels lower than chemical level, new schemes and things emerge in such a way that the possible schemes of recurrence and possible things get actualized in accord with successive schedules of probability. In other words, otherwise coincidental manifolds of conjugate acts in lower levels invite the higher integration effected by higher conjugate forms.

1. 1. Flexibility of the Generalized Emergent Probability

One of the characteristics of the emergence of new schemes of recurrence is that since the actualization of possibilities diverge non-systematically from probabilities, there always are alternative possibilities when one of them gets actualized. The course of development of this world involves two kinds of flexibility: major flexibility and minor flexibility.

Minor flexibility has to do with the possibility of achieving the same goal through different routes. Since the emergent process from potency to higher forms can follow different ways, there is always possibility that the same development in any of the levels higher than chemical can emerge along different routes. For example, we do not have to eat spaghetti everyday since there are other foods which can supply the same nutrition as that which spaghetti does. Also while water which cooks spaghetti can be boiled on an electric stove, or on fire made by burning woods, while the electricity which is the source of the electric stove is supplied through water, oil, or atomic energy etc. Therefore, once the goal of the development in terms of horizontal finality in one level of schemes and in terms of vertical finality in hierarchical multiple levels is understood, any course can be chosen out of possible set of linked sequences to achieve the same goal.

Major flexibility has to do with a shift or modification of the objective of schemes in multiple levels. The functioning of the higher integration involves expansion and modification of accidental manifolds in lower levels it integrates, and the changing manifolds calls for a shift of the ultimate objective of the development by introducing new integration in the levels higher than the one which actually integrates
them until the possibilities of development along a particular direction reaches its limit. For example, a man who has been practicing exercise with the aim of having good health finds that his muscle and cardio-vascular activities have happened to become strong enough to compete in marathon races, changes his job, and becomes a professional athlete who can earn money by winning races.

1. 2. Human Cognitional Operations is the Only Scheme that can Intentionally Affect the Probability of Other Schemes.

Human cognitional operations are one of the schemes of recurrence in this world and their happening is conditioned by and conditions the happening of other schemes. What makes the scheme of human cognitional activities unique among the entire generalized emergent probability is that through it we can understand the interdependence of schemes and the flexibility of their emergence.

Through classical and statistical method, we grasp how the emergent probability functions and understand the relation between causes and possible effects of things and schemes. Also, through genetical method of inquiry, we comprehend the generalized emergent probability by understanding genetic relations among schemes. In other words, we grasp not simply the constitution of the universe as it is now at a particular time but also how it possibly can be in the future.

Accordingly, we, human beings, do not have to wait that conditions necessary for the existing and possible schemes which constitute this world and human living to happen become fulfilled in accordance to the law of probability. We can change the probability of happening of old and new schemes by adding new variables or removing variables in the existing schemes. Otherwise stated we can participate in making the actualization and continuation of particular schemes of recurrence more probable and systematic by taking the initiative in enhancing the probability of fulfillment of the conditions which are needed for things to exist and schemes to happen so that occurrence of them will be helpful for the world to become more intelligible. By doing so we make an active and intentional influence on the process of the world's development. Hence comes the responsibility of human actions in the world process.

2. Ontological Good and Human Good

Human living is an item in the whole world process, and its actions involve interlocked sequences of schemes of recurrence in physical, chemical, organic, neural,
psychic and intellectual levels with each higher level integrating the otherwise coincidental manifolds of events in lower levels than that. While schemes in the levels under organic are static, those in higher levels are always on the move so that new integration in higher levels become possible. Therefore, the more man develops in the intelligent and reasonable level of consciousness, in accord with an unrestricted, detached, and disinterested desire to know, the more he becomes pushed to transcend those levels to higher level in which his deliberate actions are understood to be intelligibly, reasonably and responsibly related to the context of the existing world as those of a participating agent who can and has a responsibility to make more intelligent influence in the process of making the world more intelligible. In other words, the more developed man becomes, the more self-consistency in knowing and doing he becomes demanded.  

Being, which is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, is good. Since this universe is incomplete and in the process of becoming more intelligible and fuller being, what participates in its process of the world's becoming more intelligible and realizing all possible existents and all events are, from the pre-human, ontological aspect, potentially, formally and actually good.

Potential goods are all the coincidental manifolds of events in lower levels of being which can be intelligible by being integrated to schemes of recurrence in higher levels than those. Formal good are the manifolds which are grasped intelligible as a part of schemes of recurrence in higher levels. Actual good is the manifolds which are judged to be integral to them.

From the human side, human good is a part of ontological good in so far as it is under some intelligible order and contributes towards the development of the ontological good. The good with which human actions are directly involved consists of 'particular good,' 'good of order,' 'value.' 'Particular goods' are the object of spontaneous desires of each individual of us. 'Good of order' is a dynamic system which systematizes individual desires, particular goods on the basis of intelligent grasp of the interdependent relations between human desires, operations, particular goods, existing and possible things, and recurrent schemes which conditions the particular goods so that the probability of fulfilling the conditions for schemes which supply particular goods to as many people as possible to recur gets heightened. 'Value' is particular good and good of order as the possible object of rational and actual choice. The good of order and the particular goods which are systematized by the good of order become
values once they are considered as possible objects of rational choice.

Since desires for particular goods are spontaneous those particular goods may or may not be desired and chosen in a way that they are understood in relation to the development of the world order. Especially for those whose consciousness is not adequately differentiated to become aware of and to understand the relation among desires, especially the relation between desires, which aims at satisfaction on the level of being lower than intellectual and intellectual desire, whose immanent criterion is the attainment of an unconditioned which is independent of the individual and different values it remains hard to distinguish the authentic particular goods, which means particular goods which are truly good and help the development of the world and unauthentic particular goods which are apparently but not truly good. Also, since the understandings on the basis of which good of order is instituted are not necessarily correct ones in reference to the world order, there appear authentic good of orders and unauthentic ones.

If we consistently choose actions which aim at actualizing terminal value.\(^17\) which is the authentic particular good and authentic good of order, and which can be a constructive part of the world order and also choose actions which help ourselves become more willing to cooperate with the development of this world (originating value) we can constitutively participate in the fuller and better development of the entire world which includes the human world.

How, then, do we make a transition through intelligent and reasonable level to the self-conscious, existential level?

3. Knowledge of Value and Actions

What prompts the subject to make a transition through intelligent and reasonable levels to self-conscious, existential level is the notion of value, which is one of the transcendental notions. It invites and presses the subject to head towards the self-consistency of knowing and participating in constructing the ontological good by deliberating the relation between particular goods and good of order and actually choosing some among them. What bridges the realm of knowing facts and the realm of choosing actions, deciding and performing the decision are apprehension of value, practical insights\(^18\) and knowledge of value.\(^19\)
3. 1. Apprehension of Value

One of the initial components of knowledge of value is the explicit or implicit awareness of the apprehension of value. The apprehension of value is given in feelings as intentional responses, but what it intends needs to be revealed by further conscious operations which begin with asking questions what it is.

Being pushed by the transcendental notion of value, which is experienced as 'moral feeling,' not to stop with intelligent and rational levels and to go up higher to the existential level for the self-consistency between knowing and doing, man experiences vague apprehension of value, with which we feel compelled to choose and perform some actions which make influence on the existence and constitution of things other than himself and begins asking questions such as what actions he can, wants to, had better perform in his daily life. Answers to these questions will be reached in two steps through the cognitional operations in two levels of consciousness respectively.


Conscious operations which aim at knowledge of value presuppose knowledge of facts, which are grasped through intellectual and rational levels of consciousness. Knowledge of facts provides us with knowledge of the concrete situation, which become data that volitional cognitional operations begin to work with.

On the basis of knowledge of facts, which are grasped in intellectual and rational level of consciousness, we ask questions and get direct insights on what courses of actions are concretely possible for him to perform, and asks reflective questions on the correctness of the answers, gets indirect insights and makes judgments of fact. Judgments which are made in this step are not yet judgments of 'value' but judgments of 'fact,' since the answers to these questions are given on the intelligent and rational level of consciousness and do not yet directly involve responsibility of the knower. In this regard these questions are the same as questions of facts in their basic nature except in one point.

What he is supposed to grasp through the questions in this step is not facts, which already exist, but only possibility of things and events which do not yet but are possible to exist or occur. Therefore, what he can get through reflective questions is not the virtual unconditionedness of the conditioned but the possible existence of new things or occurrence of new events, which will become facts and virtually uncondi-
tioned only after the considered actions are actually taken.

3. 3. Second Step: Practical Reflection,\textsuperscript{25}—on the existential level—, a Part of which is Knowledge of Value of Making Facts

On the basis of the knowledge of the possible courses of actions we ask further questions on the implications and results of the actual performance of the possible courses of action and also questions about reasons for our taking each of the possible courses of action. As agents who can make the possible things exist and possible events occur through our own actions, we ask such questions as what results our actions will bring out, how we can perform them successfully, how big is the risk the actions involve. Also, we ask which course we want to or should choose among the courses of action which have been found possible for us to perform and why. Asking and answering those questions in this step moves us from intellectual and rational level further to the existential level of consciousness, and transforms us from a knower to a potential and possible doer.

3. 3. (i) Differentiation of Feelings

When we ask questions on the existential level of consciousness, the answers to the questions, which are reasons for our own acts, may vary depending on how differentiated our consciousness and feelings are, what kind of scale of values we have, and how advanced knowledge of the universe or the concrete situation we have. This is also because there are not simply actions performed after adequate deliberation on the value of the particular actions but also actions which occur through neural responses, sensitive routines, and feelings which do not necessarily get along with intelligence.

Feelings are a part of the underlying sensitive flow.\textsuperscript{26} They are fundamentally spontaneous,\textsuperscript{27} but through the interaction between the subjects they become reinforced, curtailed, refined, enriched, deepened, differentiated, or deranged. They are distinguished into 'non-intentional states' and 'intentional states.' Intentional states may further be distinguished in two stages.

In the first stage the consciousness and feelings have not yet been adequately differentiated and, therefore, most of what feelings intend are objects of mainly vital\textsuperscript{28} or self-centered desires. In this stage, intention gets its bearings from the anticipation whether what is intended satisfies the physical needs or whether it benefits our short
-term self-interest. Moreover, since feelings are undifferentiated in this stage, the basic characteristic of feelings is 'drifter,' by which I would like to mean a state that feelings are moved towards whatever trend of common sense opinions which we have not understood but by which we happen to be surrounded at particular time and place. Otherwise stated, feelings in this stage tend to become manipulated very easily.

Feelings as intentional states can be in the other more advanced stage, as well, in which consciousness is more differentiated than in the former stage and feelings become more cooperative with the notion of value which propels us from cognitional self-transcendence to further self-transcendence in the realm of human responsibility. In this stage, multiple aspects of values—particular good and good of order, which is pertained to vital, social, cultural, personal and religious values—become recognized, even unthematically, and the relation among them in a hierarchical order can be understood. In this stage, as well as the goal of vital needs, there appear other goals, which intention heads the subject. And the criterion to distinguish the ultimate goal from other possible goals is understood to be whether what is to be intended is desirable or not in reference to the universal order. Unless feelings as intentional response are differentiated enough to be in this stage, actions can be chosen without adequate deliberation of the effects of actions in terms of value.

3.3. (ii) Questions and Knowledge of Value

Questions which aim at knowledge of value are raised if feelings as intentional response are differentiated to be aware of the need of adequate deliberation of interrelation among possible actions.

Knowledge of value is a 'part' of practical reflection and it is attained in the existential level of consciousness by asking questions concerning specifically the value of actions in reference to the scale of value the questioner possesses. It is the same as knowledge of facts in terms of its structure but different in its objects, and is classified into two kinds: simple knowledge of value and comparative knowledge of value. 30

(a) Simple and Comparative Knowledge of Value

Simple knowledge of value precedes comparative knowledge of value. In simple knowing of value we ask questions what actions are worthwhile doing; get direct insights that some actions may be worth doing; ask reflective questions whether each of those particular actions is actually worthwhile or not; get reflective insights;
make simple judgment of value. Comparative knowledge of value has to do with the priority among the actions known to be worthwhile. On the basis of simple knowledge of value, we ask on which action priority should be put in terms of importance and urgency; get direct insight; ask reflective questions whether the grasped priority actually corresponds to the hierarchy of the authentic good; get indirect insight; make comparative judgments of value.

(b) Moral Transcendence has Two Terms: Internal and External

What is the difference between the knowledge of facts and knowledge of value? The crucial difference between cognitional self-transcendence and moral self-transcendence is that the term by reaching which the conscious activities completes their scheme in the former is internal while that in the latter had better be said to have two terms; internal and external. In other words, conscious operations in the existential level have two kinds of self-transcendence to achieve.

In terms of knowledge of facts, the scheme of recurrence of cognitional self-transcendence completes, term is reached and begins its recurrence when we make a correct judgment. In so far as knowledge of value is a product of knowing, cognitional scheme of recurrence through which the knowledge is attained has internal term—'internal' in our consciousness—and we reach it by grasping the virtually unconditionedness of what is understood, although what is grasped by reflective questions and reflective insight in knowledge of value is not the virtual unconditionedness of facts but the possibility that the understood will become virtually unconditionally good when actualized. Since knowledge of value are attained by intending the self-transcendence in the existential level, therefore, it can be said that moral self-transcendence has an internal term.

Strictly speaking, however, knowledge of value is what mediates cognitional operations and volitional operations aiming at the consistency between knowing and doing, and it is not that all the operations that consist of knowledge of value happen exclusively on the existential level of consciousness. The scheme of recurrence of the self-transcendence in the existential level of consciousness reaches an end of a circle not when we ask and understand what actions are worthwhile for us to do in what order, and make a correct judgment of value that the actions understood worthwhile are really worthwhile, but when we decide to and actually perform them. Unless decisions are made and actions are performed the scheme of recurrence in the existen-
tial level of consciousness does not complete and the notion of value keeps pushing the subject through uneasy feelings until it makes a decision and carries out the decision. Accordingly, moral self-transcendence has an external term, as well as internal term, and it is reached and responsibility emerges only when the actions correctly known truly valuable are decided to be done and actually performed. It is only when we make correct judgments of value and know what actions are worthwhile for us to do, which action is to be performed first and decide to and actually carry out the decision that we transcend ourselves in the existential level of consciousness and become a moral self.

In this regard, when Lonergan talks about the moral self-transcendence in terms of knowledge of value it seems better understood when interpreted in a following sense: that when we attain correct knowledge of value we are ‘in the process’ of morally transcending ourselves and not that the scheme of the moral self-transcendence has reached a term. In order to keep this distinction from being mixed up, let me qualify the moral self-transcendence, as a matter of convenience, by naming the moral self-transcendence in terms of knowledge of value as ‘cognitional-moral self-transcendence,’ and assigning the ‘moral self-transcendence’ only to what is reached when we actually perform the actions known worthwhile.

§ 3. Immanently Generated Knowledge and Knowledge Based on Belief

1. Why Belief is necessary?

What we have seen above is the basic general constitution of human cognitional and volitional activities. One of the significant implications of these activities is that these human activities always happen and develop not individually but collaboratively in communities.

Most knowledge we possess is not attained by ourselves going through all the levels of consciousness beginning with the awareness of data, but mainly by borrowing from the results of others’ acts of knowing. The former kind of knowledge is called “immanently generated knowledge,” and the latter is distinguished from the former as knowledge based on “belief.” Most of the knowledge each of us possesses consists of symbiosis of immanently generated knowledge and knowledge based on belief. Why is that so?

Firstly, we begin to step out of the world of immediacy and enter the world
mediated by meaning when our cognitional operations begin to function with the data which are not available in our immediate daily living and not simply with the data immediately given in our nursery. What stimulates and prompts the process of our cognitional acts' making a shift from the world of immediacy to the world mediated by meaning is a certain amount of knowledge given to us, like a bucketful of water to prime a pump of a newly dug well, with which we begin asking questions about objects which do not appear in our immediate experience. Since this knowledge is given to us it has to come from others.

It is nothing but our cognitional operations that makes the shift from the world of immediacy to the world mediated by meaning, but it is knowledge borrowed from others that heightens the probability of the recurrence of the cognitional scheme in the world mediated by meaning to the extent that it appears almost impossible, without a certain accumulation of borrowed knowledge, for the cognitional scheme to keep recurring in the world mediated by meaning.

Secondly, the numbers of purely immanently generated knowledge we attain, which means knowledge we attain by starting with pure data and without any borrowed knowledge from others, is quite limited. The majority of immanently generated knowledge presupposes knowledge based on belief as a part of data in its process of getting direct and reflective insights. For example, a scientist who identifies a particular set of data as a new kind of virus can understand and verify his hypothesis on the ground of the borrowed knowledge of the nature of other viruses found by other scientists. And the amount of knowledge required to have more advanced immanently generated knowledge is usually larger than the immanently generated knowledge each of us ourselves attains.

Thirdly, our asking questions does not start, strictly speaking, with sensing data. What happens between sensing data and perceiving is 'paying attention to' a 'certain part' of the data sensed. We rarely ask questions starting with all the aspects of the data sensed, and the remaining aspects of the same data which are sensed but neither perceived nor paid attention to remain stocked in our memory or becomes forgotten once we stop sensing them. The process of perceiving or paying attention is, in other words, the process of selecting a certain part of the data, and what the selection takes its bearings from is a set of borrowed knowledge we possess. Otherwise stated, borrowed knowledge constitutes our intellectual horizon and context in which our cognitional activities are made and develop. Accordingly, what kind of borrowed
knowledge we possess determines, to a great extent, what part of the data we become interested in asking questions of. This is one of the reasons why two people seeing the same data can ask totally different questions. And, as far as we keep borrowing knowledge, our cognitional activities remains characterized by the borrowed knowledge from the moment of the beginning of their process.

Fourthly, no matter how much time is given to each individual, the amount of knowledge we can attain and the ability we are endowed to know have limitation. We cannot answer ten questions at the same time, unless the intelligibility all those questions aim at is one and the same. Also, none of us can understand more complex matters without having understanding of less complex matters. In order for the human kind to develop as a whole, therefore, there is the need of avoiding the repetition of going through the process of knowing the same primitive things as many times over as the number of all human beings ever lived.

Hence the necessity of sharing knowledge. And, as a matter of fact, the value of sharing knowledge has long been taken for granted in the human history, whether it has been explicitly recognized or not.

Since sharing knowledge is the kernel of the constitution of the human world, its success or failure characterizes history. Whether the collaboration works well or not depends on the statistical combinations of the conditions which make good collaborations likely. The solution of the problems in human history, therefore, will become possible through the critical analysis of the nature and function of belief and of its failure found in the actual course of history.

2. How Belief Functions?

Believing is an action which carries out a decision which is based on a judgment of value of accepting and affirming to be true particular knowledge attained by others. This judgment of value has four conditions to be fulfilled. The conditions are the existence of the self-transcendence involved in four judgments which are attained by those who offer knowledge to believe and by those who believe it.

The self-transcendence is of two kinds. One of them is the cognitional self-transcendence attained through the correct judgement of ‘fact’ and there are two judgments of facts to be made: (A) and (B). The other is the cognitional-moral self-transcendence attained through the judgement of ‘value’ and there are two judgments of value to be made: (C) and (D). The fulfillment of the conditions for the final
judgment of value of believing particular knowledge (E) becomes known by grasping whether two preliminary judgements of fact (A), (B) and two judgments of value (C), (D)\textsuperscript{39} are correctly made or not.

**Condition 1:** Cognitional-Moral Self-transcendence involved in the 'General Judgment of Value' (C) made both by those who attain particular knowledge and those who borrow the knowledge

One of the cognitional-moral self-transcendence has to do with the cognitional-moral transcendence of both those who have knowledge to offer and those who believe it. Taking the collaborative nature of development of human culture into consideration we judge it worthwhile for us to share knowledge with one another. Unless we correctly make this judgment that sharing knowledge is a good thing even with taking the possibility of misuse of that into consideration, we do not dare to believe anything at all. This ‘general judgment of value,’ Lonergan names, of believing is the foundation of all beliefs, and on the basis of this judgment, there have come to appear various kinds of cooperations to create the good of order\textsuperscript{40} in order to make sharing the knowledge be done as efficiently as possible. Languages are invented and develop, books are written, schools and institutions are established to hand down knowledge to succeeding generations and share it with as many people as possible.

**Condition 2:** Cognitional Self-transcendence in the Judgment of Fact (A) Made by the One Who Attained the Understanding

This has to do with the accuracy of the content of the information to believe. When we make a correct judgement of fact, we grasp the unconditioned which is “independent not only of particular places and times but also of the particular mind that happens to be its subject.”\textsuperscript{41} Because of this conditioned independence, what is known is transmittable “from place to place and time to another and from one mind to another.”\textsuperscript{42}

**Condition 3:** Cognitional-Moral Self-transcendence involved in ‘Specific’ judgment of value (D), by the one who attained particular knowledge, of offering his knowledge to others to share and in the actual offer of the knowledge

Sharing knowledge becomes possible only if the person who attained the knowledge makes not only a ‘general’ judgement of value of ‘sharing knowledge with
others', but also a 'specific' judgment of value of 'offering the particular knowledge he himself attained' and actually offers his knowledge. The specific judgement of value of sharing knowledge by the one who attained it counts more than the general one. It is because unless he is not interested in sharing with others the particular knowledge he himself attained and keeps it in his mind until his death, even though he makes a general judgment that it is worthwhile to share knowledge with others, there is no way that others can benefit by the knowledge.

Conditions 4: Cognitional Self-transcendence in the Particular Judgment of Value

(Fact)(B) made by those who believe the particular knowledge offered

The 'particular' judgment of value (fact) of believing is made by those who are to believe the given information after reflective act of understanding on “the trustworthiness of a witness, a source, a report, the competence of an expert, the soundness of judgment of a teacher, a counsellor, a leader, a statesman, an authority.” It regards the presence of cognitional self-transcendence in the judgment of fact and cognitional-moral self-transcendence in the judgment of value by the one who attained the knowledge to believe, the reliability of the source which communicates the knowledge, on the accuracy of its communication.

What is to be noted is that question leading to the 'particular judgment of value' asks whether it is worthwhile to believe a certain particular knowledge, and when we make this judgment, we attain cognitional-moral self transcendence. However, the answer to the question of worthiness of believing particular knowledge is usually given by answering a series of questions of facts. Strictly speaking, therefore, particular judgment of value of believing is not judgment of 'value' in an ordinary sense but rather a complex judgment of 'value and fact,' since the object the question intends is not 'value' but 'fact,' questions to answer are such as whether the source is reliable, whether the information has been communicated exactly as it was in the mind of the one who has achieved the knowledge, and its fulfillment of conditions is given by judgments of facts.

Only if de facto the above four judgments are correctly made and therefore the conditions become fulfilled,

(1) we grasp as virtually unconditioned the value of believing the particular knowledge and make a judgment of value of believing it. On the basis of this judgment,

(2) We decide to believe it, and
3. Problems of Belief

3.1. Fact of Evil

One of the reasons why the account of belief is in chapter Twenty of Insight, in which the problem of evil and its solution is discussed, is because "among the evils that afflict man, none is graver than the erroneous beliefs..." 47

There is a fact of evil, which is a statistical rule. 48 The fact may be classified into two kinds: physical evil and moral evil. 49 Physical evil is the results of the shortcomings of a world order that consists in a generalized emergent probability and exclude human deliberate actions. All events are conditioned as a part of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence and the events happen according to the statistical law. There is always possibility of failure of happening of what can happen when all the conditions are not fulfilled and of the consequent break-downs of the schemes. If a certain possible event does not happen because the conditions required for it to happen are not fulfilled, the failure of happening of the event is called 'physical evil.' 50

Moral evil is the consequences of the failure of free will to choose and perform a morally authentic course of action or its failure to reject to perform a morally reprehensible course of action.

As explained above, since we, human beings, can grasp, though mostly untheoretically, how the generalized emergent probability functions and understand the relation between causes and possible effects of things and schemes, we can take the initiative in enhancing the probability of happening of the conditions which are needed for things to exist and schemes to occur.

Man's control 51 over the generalized emergent probability is not necessarily always successful because man's personal intellectual and volitional development is also a part of the generalized emergent probability, and therefore is always probable and incomplete. 52 While we are endowed with essential freedom to choose any one we want to among the possible courses of making history, our intellectual and volitional development is hampered by the four-fold bias 53 which is derived from misapplication of the duality of human knowing: dramatic, individual, group and general biases. 54 Accordingly, our effective freedom is restricted not simply by the external circumstance and by psychoneurotic disorders but more significantly by the incomplete

(3) We assent that the information is true. We believe it.
intellectual and volitional development. Hence moral impotence, basic sins,\textsuperscript{55} which are the actual failure of choosing the right course and moral evils as its results.

The problem is that since man's intellectual and volitional scheme of recurrence has not full control over the other schemes, moral evils are more serious than physical evils in the long run. There is a strategy, however, to prevent devastating failure of our control over the generalized emergent probability.


It is to establish some means to control the scheme of recurrence which is the source of control of other schemes, that is human cognitional activities, and to help the process of man’s understanding advance as constructively as possible. This can be done individually and collectively.

Individually we can understand (1) that among possible and probable schemes of recurrence is our own cognitional and volitional activities, (2) that since the result of those activities affect the world order, our getting as many correct insights as possible is the most fundamental conditions to control possible schemes of recurrence more helpful for the development of this world, and (3) that in order that the world develops authentically our conscious intentionality needs to shift from the realm of common sense through the realm of theory to the realm of interiority\textsuperscript{56} and to understand the normative and trans-cultural nature of the scheme of cognitional operations and verify that the scheme happens and recurs in our own consciousness.

What is problematic, however, is that individual control depends on the effectiveness of the collective control in particular communities. It is rare that we reach understanding of all these points by ourselves. It is because asking questions leading to understanding of these points begins to be raised usually after each individual has advanced in terms of accumulating shared knowledge on how the world is constituted; the sharing and learning the shared knowledge becomes possible through the good of order established in particular communities; and establishing such good of order to help sharing knowledge as institutions and means to collect, record, understand, systematize, transmit the already attained knowledge cannot be done unless collectively.

It is also because we borrow not only knowledge attained by others, but also questions, definite answers which may have not yet been attained by anyone. Ques-
tions leading to understanding of the points with which individual control of our own
cognitional and volitional schemes begins are shared and learned as well, in such ways
as writing books which provide selected data with which our attention becomes
directed and focused enough to ask the aimed questions. Plato's dialogues and
Lonergan's *Insight* are examples of this.

Accordingly, the success or failure of the individual control is conditioned by
what kind of actualized good of order, which is the means of collective control of
cognitional and volitional schemes, is available, and how authentically it is functioning.
For example, we go to school so that we become able to read, write and compute. No
matter how ambitious we may be, however, our success of enhancing the degree of
supplying the conditions which make us more intelligent and knowledgeable depends
on such facts as whether good schools exist within his commutable distance or how
many or what kind of books are available for us to read. Also, the chances are larger
in universities which have good philosophical core curricula than in those which do not
that their students ask questions on the nature of cognitional and volitional activities
and human responsibilities over the generalized emergent probability in this world and
on how to prevent moral evils by following the transcendental precepts: being atten­
tive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible.

3.3. Disorder of the Structure of Belief

Since the most fundamental scheme to control the emergent probability of this
world is the scheme of human cognitional and volitional activities, and the success or
failure of individual control of them depends on the authenticity and effectiveness of
the good of order, which is established collectively, through which sharing knowledge
and questions become possible and easy, disturbing beliefs becomes the greatest moral
evil.

Disturbance occurs both in those who offer knowledge for others to believe and
in those who believe the offered knowledge. In terms of the former, problems arise
when they diffuse mistaken knowledge whether wittingly or not. In terms of the latter,
problems become more serious because they involve the 'structure' of belief rather
than 'contents' of particular beliefs.

What kind of symptoms does the disorder of the structure of belief develop, and
how? To answer this, two questions should be asked: firstly, what part of the nature
of belief tends to be more subject to moral evil?, and secondly, which element of the
structure of belief is most vulnerable to abuse?

3. 3. (i) Structure of Belief

Firstly, the part of nature of belief which tends to be more susceptible to manipulation is that because of which the structure of belief is judged valuable after all. The value of believing hinges on whether it helps human beings share knowledge, and whether it exempts us from going through virtually impossible and endless labour of understanding of all the knowledge ever attained by human beings in the past. Otherwise stated, belief is understood and judged to be valuable because it enable us to skip the cognitional steps where questions in terms of the correctness of understandings are asked and answered. Accordingly, before believing, in terms of the reliability of the source, no matter how careful we are when we make a particular judgement of value, once we believe certain pieces of information and stock those information in our memory, it becomes rare for us to make a critical inventory of the contents of the information unless unexpected situation demands it.

3. 3. (ii) Particular Judgment of Value of Belief

Secondly, it is the particular judgment of value of belief that is vulnerable to manipulation. General judgment of value of believing is hardly made mistaken. No one can seriously say that it is of no value to share knowledge. Even though some may have said so, the chances are that the actual performance of those who say so is not consistent with their statement.\(^{57}\) There are, however, innumerable cases in which we make wrong particular judgments of value of belief.

Particular judgment of value of belief is concerned with the reliability of the source for this belief, and the accuracy of the communication from the source. Particular judgment of value of belief in an ideal situation is supposed to be made only after critical examination of those who diffuse the information and of the means through which the information is communicated, and we can reach probable judgment by cross-examining other sources or means and consistency of other informations carried by the same source.\(^{58}\) In the actual situation, however, particular judgments of value of belief as well depend on beliefs. The reason of this is not simply because it is easier for us to borrow from others particular judgment of value of believing certain knowledge than attaining immanently generated knowledge on the reliability of the source and means, but more significantly because since the amount of knowledge
the urgency of living daily life demands us to have is always larger than that of immanently generated knowledge we possibly attain, virtually no one can afford to spending time in examining the reliability of the source and the accuracy of the means.

This does not say that we do not make sound particular judgments of value of belief after critical examination of the source at all. We do. But the ratio that believing after critical examination of the source and means bears to that of believing by beliefs on them is very small. How, then, can we make judgment of value of believing in or borrowing others' particular judgment of value (fact) on the reliability and accuracy of the source?

The particular value of believing in or borrowing others' particular judgment of value (fact) on the reliability and accuracy of a particular source or means through which particular knowledge is shared, is mediated and assented to often through feelings.

It is only after our consciousness becomes existentially differentiated that we become able to deliberate on the process of setting up conditions through which gets heightened the actual frequencies of existence of willingness to do what is understood and judged to be done and of the occurrence of willing. However, as far as we live in this world we do not have choice not to make any actions until our consciousness get differentiated and we become able to make adequate deliberation. Fact is, therefore, that we have to act no matter how little we understand what we are doing.

What makes us act and gives our actions its bearings until we become responsible subjects are feelings which are communicated through such means as intersubjective actions, symbols, arts which are given in particular communities which share unthematcally the same goals, concerns and interests, or feelings which identify ourselves to persons or things which provides us directions to follow. We believe in and borrow someone's particular knowledge of value (fact) on the reliability of the source and accuracy of communication of the particular knowledge to be believed often because we feel that it seems to be safe to believe someone's particular judgments on them by reasons such as that the person belongs to the same communities as ours, that he loves us. Children believe that geographic information on their textbooks is correct because their teachers are using them without any criticism on their content. As described above, however, since the basic characteristic of feelings before they are differentiated is 'drifter,' feelings tend to be at the mercy of those who give us, wittingly or unwittingly, incorrect particular judgments of value of believing.
Because of these characteristics, the function of belief easily turns to be a hot bed of corruption by fostering dramatic, individual, group and general biases and in return those biases to augment mistaken beliefs.

Also, since the entire amount of knowledge we come to possess, whether it is correct or wrong, grows and it always is easier to believe it than admitting the necessity of critical reflection of the content of belief or its source or communicating means and actually performing the reflection, the more time passes by the greater the gap between the speed and degree of disperse of belief and those of its criticism widens.

What can make the matter worse is that what we take in through belief is not simply fragmental and individual propositions, which are expressions of knowledge reached by others, but more significantly an entire horizon and world view, which are woven out of innumerable pieces of beliefs. Since making critical reflection on our own intellectual horizon and world view is like examining the nature of the ground on which our houses are built, which may eventually make it inevitable, in some cases, to destroy and rebuild the entire houses, there is no wonder that we feel reluctant to go down to the roots of the corruption of belief and attempt a radical remedy. The vicious circle continues. How can we get out of the vicious circle?

3. 4. Remedy of Mistaken Beliefs

There are three basic steps to eliminate mistaken beliefs. First, it is for us to understand the structure of belief; second to find at least one mistaken belief, the content of which is mistaken; and third to understand the root of the problem of mistaken believer. The most difficult one is the third because in order for us to do so we are required to understand not only the structure of belief but also all the points that I have written above, even in a limited sense.

§ 4. Theology as Human Inquiry Based on Belief

Theology is a part of human intellectual collaboration. Since it is human inquiry based on belief, chances are that theologies, as well as other human inquiries, have been affected by certain kinds of disorders of belief throughout the entire history of theological development.

In theology, there are distinguished two parts which consist of belief. One part is the objects theology makes its inquiry about, while the other is the knowledge
Theologians inherit from their former generations with which they do their theology. There is no big difficulty in our recognizing the fact that the content of the initial revelation has been believed. This is not the case with the latter.

It is rare for us to be aware of the fact that our theological inquiry does not begin in vacuum and starts always with data which are usually selected in the process of our perceiving them and partly and already interpreted on the basis and through the influence of the previous understandings. These previously given understandings may be called 'pre-suppositions' in a limited sense that we borrow them from others through belief without explicit awareness of our doing so.

It is presuppositions as the product of belief that enables each of us to start doing theology after all and to advance in our understanding without our repeating the same primitive stage of inquiry. The function of belief, however, is akin to a double-edged sword. The reason because of which belief is worthwhile becomes the reason because of which destructive consequences might occur. Since the role of belief is so fundamental in order for us to control the development of this world, confusion caused by the disorder of belief becomes one of the greatest disasters human beings are responsible for. When contemporary theologies, specifically Christologies, show various types of symptom of confusion, it is not wide of the mark to examine whether there have been anything wrong with presuppositions which theologians have been working with and have taken for granted until now.

Also, whether theology helps the human world develop or takes part in the cycle of its decline depends on how theologians make a critical reflection on the role and nature of what has been believed in theology.

What kind of presuppositions, then, have been taken for granted in the history of doing theologies and more particularly in doing Christologies, and what kind of them have been in trouble? This is the question I would like to answer in my next paper.

**Bibliography**

1. **Works by Bernard Lonergan**


2. General Works by Others


Notes


5 On ‘schemes of recurrence,’ ‘things,’ and ‘emergent probability,’ see Insight, pp. 118–128; 259–262;

6 Comparison between schemes of recurrence in the planetary system and those in the organic psychic and intellectual level, see Insight, p. 459.

7 Insight, p. 451.

8 On major and minor flexibility of development, see Insight, p. 449; 453–454.


10 Insight, pp. 209–211.

11 Insight, pp. 598–599.

12 Insight, p. 444.

13 Insight, p. 596.

14 Insight, pp 604–607.

15 Insight, pp. 595–604.


17 On ‘terminal value’ and ‘originating value’ see Insight, pp. 601–602.

18 On ‘practical insight’ and ‘practical reflection’ see Insight, pp. 609–612.
19 It seems that ‘understanding and judgment of value’ had better be distinguished from 'practical insight' in a sense that practical insight belongs to the realm of knowing facts.


21 Method, p. 37.

22 Method, p. 38.

23 On 'practical insight,' and 'practical reflection,' see Insight, pp. 609–612.

24 By 'volitional-cognitional operation' I attempt to mean 'cognitional operations which aim at knowledge of value.'

25 ‘Practical reflection’ is not ‘reflective questions’ which ask about the correctness of the understanding. It consists of questions of facts and values on particular actions.

26 Insight, pp. 608–609.

27 Method, p. 32.

28 Lonergan explains that the object in this stage is “the agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying.” Method, p. 31.

29 Lonergan explains that the object in this stage only are values. However, the object in the previous stage can be said to be value also, in this case, vital value. Accordingly, I contrast the former stage with the later stage in terms of the degree of differentiation of consciousness. In the former stage all values are neither fully recognized nor differentiated, and rational choice is under the dominant influence of spontaneity, so that it intends vital value as the major value to choose. In the later stage other values are recognized and distinguished.

30 Method, pp. 36–41.

31 What is grasped by reflective insight is not the virtually unconditioned of facts but the probability that the understood will become virtually unconditionally good when actualized.

32 Insight, p. 611.

33 Method, pp. 44–45.

34 Lonergan talks about the nature and function of belief, first in Insight and secondly in Method in Theology in a summarized way. This account is based on what is in Insight, pp. 703–718; Method in Theology pp. 41–47. His theorem of ‘belief’ in Method in Theology, is not quite the same as that in Insight but complementary to that. What I summarize here is an account of ‘belief’ made by combining Lonergan's theorem in two books with addition of my supplement to that account.


36 Insight, p. 706.

37 Method , p. 59.

38 Insight, p. 704

39 Lonergan discusses moral self-transcendence involved in (A), (B), and (C) but not in (D).

40 On the structure of the human good, see Method pp. 47–52.

41 Insight, p. 707.

42 Insight., p. 707.

43 By ‘specific’ judgment I mean the judgment on the value of offering some specific knowledge to share with others, the judgment made by those who attain the knowledge in question. What Lonergan means by ‘particular’ judgment of value is the judgment made by those who believe on the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy in terms of communication. I name the former ‘specific’ judgment of value so that it can be
understood as a counterpart of 'particular' judgment of value.

44 *Method,* p. 45.

45 See what kind of questions are supposed to treat under the section on belief in *Method,* p. 45. They are “whether one’s source was critical of his sources, whether he reached cognitional self-transcendence in his judgments of fact and moral self-transcendence in his judgments of value, whether he was truthful and accurate in his statements.” These are questions of facts.

46 Numbers (1), (2), and (3) in this account correspond to numbers (2), (3), (4) and (5) in *Insight,* p. 708, respectively.

47 *Insight,* p. 687.

48 *Insight,* p. 693.

49 *Insight,* pp. 666-667.

50 *Insight,* pp. 666-667.

51 Lonergan uses a word ‘to control’ not in such a sense as ‘to manipulate,’ but rather meaning ‘to direct with explicit or implicit awareness of authenticity in mind.’ See *Insight,* pp. 210-211, 227, 233-234, 515; *A Second Collection,* p. 88-90, 104, 148, 168.

52 See the section on “Moral Impotence” in *Insight,* pp. 627-630.

53 On biases, see *Insight,* chapter seven, pp. 207-244.


55 On the relation between freedom and sin, see *Insight,* pp. 666-669, 692.


57 Descartes’ case is this. See his *Discourse on Method.*

58 *Method,* pp. 45-46.

59 *Insight,* pp. 612-616.

60 On ‘community of feelings and fellow feelings’ and ‘emotional identification’ see *Method,* p. 58.

61 *Insight,* pp. 716-717.